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Prime Minister Kevin Rudd has invited leading politicians and opinion makers in the region to a 
conference in early December in Sydney to discuss his vision of an Asia-Pacific Community and 
building inclusive institutions to discuss the full spectrum of security matters in the region. Besides 
wanting to ensure that Australia remains relevant rather than sidelined in any future setup, the main 
impetus behind Canberra’s push for top-down security architecture is to take a proactive approach in 
order to manage China’s rise and build institutions that can help ease current and future tensions. 
When Canberra looks northwards to Asia, it mainly sees China’s presence and ignores the other 
rising giant of the region: India. In important respects, India’s economic and strategic prospects appear 
more favourable than China’s. Even if we accept that the continued and rapid rise of China will be the 
most significant driver of change and potential instability in Asia, India’s role and its strategic weight 
in helping to ‘structurally’ constrain and manage a potentially disruptive China is poorly appreciated 
by Canberra.
The paper traces the rise of ‘strategic India’ in Asia, the significance of the remarkable improvement 
in the US-India relationship, and the rapid progress made in bringing India into the existing regional 
security order. India is becoming an increasingly important stakeholder in, and contributor to, the 
existing regional security order. The paper concludes that despite the abundance of strategic and 
diplomatic activity in the region reflecting New Delhi’s growing importance, India remains Australia’s 
great ‘strategic blind-spot.’ Although Canberra is making some efforts to improve military-to-military 
ties with India, its diplomatic engagement with New Delhi is poor. Indeed, the relatively undeveloped 
relationship between Canberra and New Delhi is the weak link in terms of India’s improving network 
of government-to-government relationships with key security partners in the Asia-Pacific.
The Indian economy still has a long way to go before it is irreversibly on the path of successful 
development. But on the back of a vibrant and growing middle class of around 300 million people, 
it is already a giant in Asia growing in confidence, ambition, power, wealth, and influence. Its rise is 
not feared by other Asian states and its values and interests are closely aligned with our own. Given 
that our diplomatic and economic resources are limited, the current focus on building new security 
architecture is an unnecessary distraction. Washington and other capitals in Asia recognise that when 
it comes to collectively meeting the challenge of China’s rise, deepening bilateral relationships with 
emerging centres of power such as New Delhi are an important priority. If Australia is to remain a 
strategically and diplomatically clever, active and relevant middle power in the future—and a key 
player in future security institutions that might be built when the Asia-Pacific region is ready—then 
looking northwards towards India rather than just East Asia is crucial.
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Fifteen years ago, Henry Kissinger nominated the United States, the European Union, 
Russia, China and Japan as the five poles of power that would define the new multi-
polar century.1 India made it only as a ‘probable.’
Today’s reality is that the European Union, Russia and Japan are facing an uncertain 
economic future, and there is increasing agreement that the twenty-first century will be 
an Asian one based overwhelmingly on the rise of China. Although America is entering 
a period of relative decline, it will still remain the dominant power in Asia and the world 
for several decades. On the other hand, the regional presence of a rising China will be 
immense. The 2009 Defence White Paper released by the Department of Defence predicts 
that China will be the strongest Asian military power by a ‘considerable margin.’2
These kinds of projections have led the Rudd government to adopt a ‘China-
centric’ view of our future regional strategic environment and security policy, alongside 
uncritical acceptance that building all-inclusive multilateral security institutions will be 
the most effective way to manage China’s rise and promote continued peace in the region 
into the future. For example, the main impetus behind Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s 
Asia Pacific Community (APC) idea is to build new security architecture in the 
region that can help manage China’s rise and diffuse future tensions. But even if one 
accepts that the continued and rapid rise of China will be the most significant driver 
of change in the region and the most likely cause of instability in Asia, there are 
legitimate criticisms that Rudd’s ‘Asia policy’ is focused too heavily on China and not 
enough on deepening relationships with allies such as Japan—still the second-largest 
economy in the world—and budding partners such as India. The future credentials 
of India are consistently ignored or given relatively little attention by officials and 
strategists in Canberra. Indeed, in the quest to build China-focused security architecture, 
the strategic role of India and the importance of its geopolitical weight in structurally 
constraining and ‘managing’ China are poorly appreciated. Beyond token statements 
acknowledging its rise, India remains our great strategic blind spot.
Ignoring India is a serious mistake and a significant oversight considering that the 
United States and our other allies and partners in Asia—also looking to anticipate 
future regional problems—are working hard to cultivate a constructive and long-lasting 
diplomatic and strategic relationship with India. Washington and other Asian capitals 
are focused on bulking up bilateral relationships with emerging centres of power such 
as New Delhi rather than the premature building of comprehensive, all-inclusive 
multilateral security institutions in the region. As the Australian Defence White Paper 
acknowledges, ‘strategic stability in the region is best underpinned by the continued 
presence of the United States through its network of security alliances and partnerships, 
including with Japan, the Republic of Korea, India and Australia.’3 Enormous efforts 
and diplomatic resources are being put into building a better bilateral relationship with 
New Delhi in Washington, Tokyo, Jakarta and Singapore, in particular, with impressive 
results. If Australia is to remain a strategically clever, active and relevant middle power, 
it is time for Canberra to do the same.
India—the other rising great power in Asia
China’s ongoing economic success story is a spectacular one, but it overlooks the fact 
that the Indian economy—more reliant on domestic consumption and less on state-led 
capital spending—has been booming for almost two decades and has tripled in size since 
1988. India’s GDP as a share of the global economy (by PPP measurement) grew from 
3.4% in 1978 to 4.6% in 2008. Growth per annum has averaged around 7.5% since the 
early 1990s, reaching 9% per annum for the past three years. Goldman Sachs estimates 
that the Indian economy will quadruple in size from 2007 to 2020, will surpass the size 
of the US economy in 2043, and will overtake Japan as the second-largest economy in 
the world behind China.4
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Despite the global downturn, the Indian economy will still grow between 7 and 8% 
in 2009. Importantly, unlike East Asian economies, 30–40% of GDP growth is due to 
rising productivity rather than ever-increasing capital and labour inputs.5 For example, 
since the 1990s, the proportion of growth explained by total factor productivity is around 
40%, compared to around 20% in the early 1980s with impressive improvements in the 
services and industry sectors.6
True, there are numerous problems that India needs to be overcome—including 
endemic corruption, institutionalised discrimination, an obstructive bureaucracy, the 
need for land reform—before setting on an irreversible path of successful and spectacular 
development. But in terms of exerting a significant strategic presence, it is significant 
that India has the largest middle class in the world—approaching 300 million people. 
China’s middle class is still only 50 million–200 million (depending on the definition). 
This means that India has a critical mass of elites generating crucial economic resources 
required by New Delhi to become a great power even if a large proportion of the 
country remains poor. Unlike China’s ageing problem,7 India will have a favourable 
working age demographic until at least the middle of the century: around 50% of India’s 
population is under 25 years old.8 In contrast, around 2015, more people will be leaving 
the workforce in China than entering it.9 The Indian working-age population is due to 
surpass China’s in 2025 (approximately 900 million people) and its overall population 
will surpass China’s by 2030–40.
India is not just a rising economic power. It has the second-largest military in the world 
and the fifth-largest navy in the world. Its rapidly growing navy is highly professional 
and includes the British-built aircraft carrier INS Viraat. New Delhi is also designing 
and building its own aircraft carriers, plans to construct its own nuclear-powered carriers 
in the near future, and boasts an indigenously built and designed nuclear powered 
submarine.10 Military spending has been consistently growing at around 10% every year 
and is currently US$26.6 billion, compared to China’s US$70.3 billion and America’s 
$518.3 billion.11
Many Australian officials privately consider their Indian counterparts as being 
painstakingly difficult and too unpredictable to deal with constructively. Yet, officials 
throughout Southeast Asia suggest to me that while this was their experience with 
New Delhi a decade ago, it is much less so the case today. Australia has a relatively small 
diplomatic presence in New Delhi—albeit ably led by Peter Varghese, former Director-
General of the Office of National Assessments—and only thinly staffed consulates in 
Mumbai and Chennai. 
Australia under Prime Minister John Howard caught on to the strategic value of 
India only during his final term in office. The current Foreign Minister, Stephen Smith, 
has promised to take Australia-India relations ‘to a new level ... to the frontline of 
our international partnerships.’12 But Prime Minister Rudd, the driving force behind 
Australia’s strategic and foreign policy, has devoted little personal and official energy 
toward any concrete initiatives and secured few outcomes. As Hamish McDonald, the 
Asia-Pacific editor of the Sydney Morning Herald, observes, Australia’s peak intelligence 
body, the Office of National Assessments, is struggling to build its analytical expertise on 
India. Australian diplomats are learning about India after they arrive in their postings.13 
Contrast the Rudd government’s relative neglect of India with the barely reported fact 
that on 24 November 2009, US President Barrack Obama will welcome Indian Prime 
Minister Manmohan Singh for the first state visit of his presidency. Despite earlier fears 
that the Obama administration would eschew the advances in the US-India bilateral 
relationship made under the presidency of George W. Bush, the current administration 
has been making low-key but consistent advances towards India. The choice of Prime 
Minister Singh as Obama’s first state guest is significant because as White House 
spokesperson Robert Gibbs explained, the visit will ‘highlight the strong and growing 
strategic partnership between the United States and India.’14
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The term ‘strategic partnership’ is not deployed lightly in official Washington circles; 
tellingly, Washington has not yet applied similar terms to the US-China relationship. 
It is now well-entrenched in the American strategic community on both sides of 
politics that a growing US-India strategic partnership can serve as a much sought-after 
‘structural constraint’ to Beijing’s ability to potentially disrupt the existing security 
order, even as China rises. It is widely accepted in both Washington and New Delhi, 
and also throughout Asia, that the US-India partnership greatly enhances the prospect 
of continued stability in the region. True, this is dependent on India continuing to rise 
and being successfully brought into the existing diplomatic and strategic structures in 
Asia. But there is growing evidence that both are occurring, meaning that India is well 
positioned to become the ‘swing state’ that could determine Asia’s future balance.
The rise of strategic India
The central position of India, its magnificent resources, its teeming multitude of 
men, its great trading harbours, its reserve of military strength, supplying an army 
always in a high state of efficiency and capable of being hurled at a moment’s 
notice upon any point either through Asia or Africa—all these are assets of 
precious value. On the West, India must exercise a predominant influence over 
the destinies of Persia and Afghanistan; on the north, it can veto any rival in 
Tibet; on the north-east … it can exert great pressure upon China, and it is one 
of the guardians of the autonomous existence of Siam.15
—Lord Curzon, Viceroy of India 1898–1905
The recent historical neglect of India as a key strategic player in Asia is an aberration 
given the sheer size of the country in a location that would thrill any geo-strategist—the 
fault of both insular Indian domestic and foreign policy since its independence in 1947 
and a lack of imagination on the part of America and its Asian allies. 
For decades, India was its own worst enemy. The country’s poorly performing 
socialist system, its cultural insularity, and reflexive anti-Americanism limiting 
New Delhi’s influence were shortcomings that stifled India’s economic growth and 
strategic value. Leading foreign policy analyst C. Raja Mohan memorably compared 
India’s older strategic culture and style to a ‘porcupine’—vegetarian, slow-footed, 
defensive, and prickly.16 Prime Minister Nehru’s aversion to the West and the early 
rhetoric of ‘non-alignment’ (which conveniently ignored the fact that India signed 
an alliance with the Soviet Union) dominated Indian strategic culture for decades. 
The result was strategic irrelevance despite the existence of such a large state.
To be sure, many of the problems between India and the United States, and India’s 
subsequent isolation, were also the result of Cold War politics. During the John F. 
Kennedy administration (1961–63), democratic India was seen as an important 
counterbalance to authoritarian China. However, the Chinese invasion of India in 
1962 meant that India moved closer to the Soviet Union following the Sino-Soviet 
split in the 1960s. Subsequently, during the two Indo-Pakistan wars in 1965 and 1971, 
Washington offered diplomatic and military assistance to Islamabad while New Delhi 
eventually signed a 20-year pact of ‘peace, friendship and cooperation’ with the Soviet 
Union in 1971 (primarily to deter possible Chinese adventurism). Further obstacles to 
a better US-India relationship were erected after President Richard Nixon initiated the 
rapprochement with China in 1972 in order to isolate the Soviets. Even though there 
was a slight easing of tensions between India and the United States when President 
Jimmy Carter assumed power, India’s refusal to support American’s anti-Soviet campaign 
after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979 significantly reversed any small 
progress in the US-India bilateral relationship. Critically, America deepened its strategic 
relationship with Pakistan after the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The increased 
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military cooperation between America and Pakistan raised fears that this might allow 
Pakistan to narrow the military gap with India, and pushed India even closer to the 
Soviet Union.
India’s emergence from this hiatus happened in a process that unfolded over several 
decades, but 1991 was the year that India decisively woke from its complacent slumber—
both economically and strategically. Importantly, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao, who 
was elected in 1991, chose the pro-reformist and free-market advocate Manmohan 
Singh as his Finance Minister to deal with the serious fiscal and economic crises facing 
the country. 
India was confronted by a serious fiscal and balance of payments problem that had 
been worsening over a number of years. These deep-seated problems were exacerbated 
by the decision to purchase a large amount of petroleum on the spot market following 
Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1991 as well as dramatic falls in 
remittances from Indian workers in the Middle East as a result of the first Gulf War. 
The decision drained the country’s foreign exchange reserves, and the economic situation 
worsened after India lost its export markets in East Europe following the disintegration 
of the Soviet Union. In barely two years, 1990–91, an estimated 110 million people 
were thrown into poverty.17 
As Finance Minister, Singh was the architect of the economic reforms that reversed 
this crisis and led to a two-decade economic boom. Unlike previous balance of payments 
led crises in 1956–57, 1965–66, and 1980–81where Indian leaders reflexively reverted 
to communist principles and tightened rather than loosen controls and regulations,18 
Singh responded by altering the direction of the nation’s economic policies. This included 
gradually abandoning import-substitution industrialisation, and slowly unravelling the 
regime of licenses, quotas, permits, and other regulations that stifled economic growth. 
To be fair to previous governments, the impetus for gradual, ad hoc liberalisation was 
already evident in the 1980s under the leadership of Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi.19 
But the 1991 crisis gave this trend an irreversible shot in the arm.
Moreover, the implosion of the Soviet Union woke the Indian strategic community 
from its complacency. India faced the final decade of the twentieth century needing a 
new strategic vision that would complement the primary goals of both maintaining 
its independence and accelerating economic development. Under Prime Minister 
Narasimha Rao, increased engagement with regional powers was seen as a strategy that 
would enhance Indian economic development, status and, ultimately, the country’s 
security. Remaining ‘independent’ no longer implied remaining ‘unaligned’; the latter 
had become devoid of any real meaning. The benefits of being a strategic ‘porcupine’ 
were minimal. Instead, New Delhi realised that an economically strong and engaged 
India, rather than a weak and isolated one, was to be the future foundation for an 
effective counter-dominance strategy. But more than this, India also came to the sensible 
realisation that a country of its size, with one of the great civilisations in the world, 
had a natural role to play as a great regional and eventually global power.
(a) Looking East
India’s Look East policy was launched in 1992. In his first budget speech in Parliament 
in July 1991, Finance Minister Singh had offered a famous quote from French novelist 
Victor Hugo—‘No power on earth can stop an idea whose time has come’—and declared 
the emergence of India as an economic power as one such idea. But looking east was 
not just an economic decision but an explicitly strategic one. Strategic engagement with 
Southeast and East Asian countries began simultaneously with economic engagement, 
not after it. Prime Minister Rao gave significant momentum to this shift by visiting 
China, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, and Singapore. 
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1992 India became an important ASEAN dialogue partner.
199 India became a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).
2002
India was placed alongside China, Japan and South Korea as an ARF summit level 
partner.
2002
Prime minister Atal Behari Vajpayee addressed the first India-ASEAN Business 
Summit.
200 India signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC).
200
India signed an agreement on India-ASEAN Partnership for Peace, Progress and 
Shared Prosperity at the rd ASEAN-India Summit.
By the time Prime Minister Singh came to power in 2004, India had long accepted 
the rhetoric of the twenty-first century being an ‘Asian century’ and its growing 
importance in a changing Asia. India grew in confidence and expressed a desire to play 
a significant role in shaping this new environment.20 For a country that once viewed 
East and Southeast Asia as a region dominated by America and its lackeys, this was an 
enormous change.
As Prime Minister Singh acknowledged, the Look East policy ‘was also a shift 
in India’s vision of the world and India’s place in the evolving global economy.’21 
India needed to find new friends after the implosion of the Soviet Union. Moreover, by 
the mid-1990s, it was undeniable that China had become a major power in the region. 
The ongoing dispute with Pakistan wasn’t going away, but India’s status as just a great 
South Asian (rather than Asian) power could no longer guarantee the country’s future 
security. In the 1990s, Chinese diplomatic strategy in the South China Sea was impulsive, 
aggressive and impatient. Since then, Beijing’s diplomacy has been much more subtle. 
As the paper observes, China’s rise—from a weak ‘rogue dragon’ to legitimate great 
power—further convinced the Indians that they had no choice but to accept a larger 
role in East and Southeast Asia.
(b) India and the US—confronting the elephant in the room
Although President George W. Bush in his second term came to the belated realisation 
that India and America shared important political values and strategic interests, the 
recent strategic interest in India had its roots after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Following 
the American invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 to remove the Taliban from power, there 
was renewed strategic interest in New Delhi since Indian influence in Afghanistan had 
been strong until the rise of the Islamabad backed Taliban’s rise to power in Kabul. 
India had supported successive governments in Kabul until the rise of the Taliban in the 
1990s and subsequently supported the Northern Alliance that helped American forces 
depose the Taliban.22 Since 2001, India has donated US$1.2 billion to Afghanistan’s 
reconstruction, making it the largest regional donor.23
Nevertheless, any further deepening of diplomatic and strategic relations between 
Washington and New Delhi still had to overcome a traditional stumbling block: the 
reluctance of India’s political and bureaucratic elites to engage with the United States, 
especially after America’s condemnation of India’s nuclear test in 1998 and the persistent 
refusal to accept India as a ‘legitimate’ and ‘responsible’ nuclear power. From New Delhi’s 
point of view, the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was an unfair agreement that served 
to entrench the interests of the then nuclear powers of the United States, Soviet Union 
(now Russia), China, France, and Britain. Persistent American backing for what former 
Indian External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh called the ‘nuclear apartheid regime’24 
was viewed as an affront to India. As Indian leaders and strategists consistently argued, 
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India had proven itself to be a responsible nuclear power with a perfect non-proliferation 
history. The continued ostracism of India as a nuclear power, according to New Delhi, 
meant a refusal to recognise and accept India as a rising and responsible great power.
A major change to repair this rift became apparent when in July 2005, George W. 
Bush and Prime Minister Singh signed a framework for an agreement under which India 
agreed to separate its civil and military nuclear facilities and place all its civil nuclear 
facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. In return, the 
United States offered India full support for its civilian nuclear program. The result was 
the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Non-proliferation Enhancement 
Act, which came into force in 2008. Even though India remains a non-signatory to 
the NPT, the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)—of which Australia is a 
member—granted India a waiver at the behest of the Americans, allowing India to enter 
into the legitimate market for nuclear materials. The agreement recognised India as ‘a 
responsible state with advanced nuclear technology’ and gave New Delhi what it wanted 
(access to fissile material from international suppliers and civilian nuclear technology) 
and legitimised India as a nuclear power after decades of international ostracism.
Interestingly, the decision by the United States to move on the nuclear deal followed 
India’s decision to apply for full membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 
(SCO) in June 2005, and again in October of that year25 (after the conclusion of the 
US-India framework agreement). Even prior to the June 2008 statement by Indian 
External Affairs Minister K. Natwar Singh that India wanted to become a full member 
of the SCO, Beijing and New Delhi spoke ambiguously about working towards a 
‘strategic partnership.’
These developments took place during the same time the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) described India as the key swing state in Asia and US strategists were 
urging the Bush Administration to prevent such an Indo-Sino partnership. Even though 
Prime Minister Singh characterised the framework agreement as one that would help 
secure Indian energy security in the future, it was squarely viewed by Indian officials 
as primarily a strategic move closer toward the United States. Notably, the deal was 
criticised by the communists from the Indian Left as being just that—one that entailed 
closer strategic relations with Washington—and condemned by the ultra-nationalistic 
Indian Right as one that would sacrifice India’s ‘strategic independence.’ Similarly, there 
is no doubt that even though the decision to conclude the deal was frequently justified by 
American officials as one designed to help meet India’s development needs by allowing 
it to purchase the nuclear materials it required to generate energy, Washington insiders 
widely admit that the primary motivation was a geo-strategic one. 
Once the framework agreement was concluded, the foundations for a deeper 
strategic partnership between the United States and India were quickly laid. This 
was complemented by India and Japan declaring an ambition for a strategic and 
economic entente ‘between Asia’s two largest democratic powers’ in December 2006. 
Then US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice spoke frequently about the United States 
‘helping India to become a world power’26 both immediately before and repeatedly after 
the signing of the framework agreement. This grand offer was matched by concrete 
initiatives such as America’s offer to help India produce world class combat aircraft. 
As C. Raja Mohan observes, ‘Our 30-year complaint [about] denial regimes [that] have 
targeted India has now been rubbished with the American offers of joint production 
of world class combat aircraft. This is not to be mistaken for a hardware sale, but a 
realization that the Americans can live with a regional power like India.’27 American 
generosity therefore extended to helping India become a major military power.
The nuclear deal was also an important prelude towards a so-called ‘de-hyphenated’ 
approach to relations between America and India. From New Delhi’s point of view, 
relations with Washington had always been complicated by India-Pakistan tensions. 
Given traditional American support for Islamabad, relations between Washington 
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be a neutral arbiter in the India-Pakistan issue. Under a ‘hyphenated’ approach, 
the US-India relationship was always vulnerable to Pakistani manipulation. By forging 
a US-India relationship independent of the India-Pakistan issue, the prospect of a blank 
slate, in theory at least, was offered to any emerging bilateral relationship between the 
United States and India. 
India was President George W. Bush’s big strategic play in the twilight of his presidency. 
To entrench the relationship, the strategic deepening between the two countries has 
been augmented by US-India naval cooperation institutionalised at the highest military 
levels, meaning that tactical and operational aspects of the partnership have become 
highly resilient to changing political whims. For example, the Malabar exercises, which 
resumed in 2002 following an interruption in the wake of the 1998 India nuclear tests, 
were elevated in importance. The September 2007 exercises involved military vessels 
and aircraft from the United States, India, Japan, Australia, and Singapore in joint 
exercises in the Bay of Bengal. Interestingly, the last time the American Seventh Fleet 
was in the Bay of Bengal was in 1971 when it was attempting to intimidate India as 
India and Pakistan fought a war that would lead to the establishment of Bangladesh. 
The 2008 exercises took place in the Arabian Sea. These involved the US nuclear 
powered aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan and anti-submarine warfare joint operations 
between the United States and India. This is significant since China is pursuing a 
sea-denial strategy against American maritime dominance, and Chinese submarines in 
Asian waters outnumber the American submarines by over four to one. US Lieutenant-
Commander John Fleming, who participated in the 2009 exercises off the coast of Japan 
notably remarked, ‘The US, Japan and India share democratic and seafaring traditions’28 
and hinted at inter-operational exercises that go beyond mere tactical operations towards 
strategic cooperation. There is also talk about conducting joint aircraft carrier exercises, 
which would be a major next step in such cooperation.
Other recent US moves to encourage closer military ties with India have been 
considerable. In January 2009, the Obama administration approved the sale of six 
Lockheed Martin Hercules military transport planes worth US$1 billion to India. 
In March 2009, the State Department approved the sale of eight Boeing P-81 maritime 
reconnaissance aircraft worth US$2.1 billion to the Indians—the largest contract 
awarded to an American company by India. Then in July 2009, Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton signed an End User Monitoring Agreement of military equipment, 
signaling an upping of trust and cooperation between the two countries. This paved the 
way for the September 2009 sale to the Indians of the ‘futuristic’ shipboard Hawkeye 
E-2D aircraft for Airborne Early Warning (AEW) and battle management. The UAE 
is the only other country that has gained State and Defense Department approval to 
purchase this technology. US sales of military hardware to India are expected to reach 
US$35 billion over the next quarter century,29 strengthening Indian reliance on American 
hardware, spare parts, and technology. India has also been looking to cooperate with 
the United States in building a ballistic missile defence (BMD) system in Asia. Finally, 
US companies are competing with rivals from Russia and France to sell fighter jets 
worth US$12 billion to the Indian Air Force. If Lockheed Martin or Boeing were to win 
the contract, this would decisively shift New Delhi’s planned US$50 billion military 
upgrade away from its traditional reliance on Moscow and towards Washington.
In a personal letter written by President Obama to Indian counterpart Manmohan 
Singh shortly after Obama’s election victory, the President-elect spoke about the ‘shared 
interests, shared values, shared sense of threats, and ever burgeoning ties between our two 
economies and societies.’ Obama then said, ‘as a starting point … our common strategic 
interests call for a redoubling of US-India military, intelligence, and law enforcement 
cooperation.’30
The former US Ambassador to India Robert Blackwill notes that the importance of 
India is now ‘sufficiently embedded in the strategic consciousness of the United States.’31 
Likewise, the strategic usefulness of closer relations with the Americans is widely accepted 
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amongst India’s policy elites, a theme in Indian foreign policy that has been reinforced 
by the emphatic victory of Prime Minister Singh’s Congress Party-led coalition in the 
May 2009 elections.
The China strategic conundrum
The recent American (and regional) interest in India as a strategic partner is enhanced 
by the fact that continued American dominance in Asia faces a new set of challenges 
that were not entirely apparent when America became the world’s only superpower less 
than two decades ago. Global and regional terrorism, as well as the ongoing situation 
in Pakistan and Afghanistan is one challenge. But by far the most important long-term 
challenge is the re-emergence of China as a great power in the region. In particular, 
China presents a strategic conundrum for America and its allies.
On the one hand, China is emerging as the clear challenger to American dominance, 
values and interests in the region. China’s newfound significance and recent revival 
of its ‘great power mentality’ is built on the back of its spectacular economic growth 
since the reforms in 1979.32 Although a beneficiary of US-backed security and stability 
in the region, China is still a dissatisfied rising power. Driven by a genuine sense of 
‘150 years of humiliation’ at the hands of Western and Japanese powers, the urge to 
return to greatness is deeply embedded in the expectations of both its leaders and social 
elites. Once the predominant power in Asia for almost 3,000 years, it is only now 
re-emerging within a regional order with a set of rules that it had no role in defining. 
It is also rising within a post-World War II regional security order that was not designed 
to accommodate the return of such a large competitor.
Chinese regional ambitions, and the view of itself as the historical and natural great 
power in Asia, put it at odds with the US-backed regional order. The question of Taiwan 
remains a flashpoint that could yet lead to war between China and the United States. 
Territorial disputes between China and countries such as India, Russia, Japan, and 
several Southeast Asian states persist even if they are stable for the moment. China still 
claims four-fifths of the South China Sea as its historical waters, and is in the process of 
acquiring a naval capacity that will extend far beyond its stated aim of winning a war 
in the Taiwan Straits. The fact that China remains authoritarian—and a key backer of 
authoritarian regimes in states such as North Korea and Myanmar—creates distrust 
in Washington and many Asian capitals. Political values have strategic significance. 
China will not receive America’s blessing (and that of its allies) as a great power to 
which it will happily cede influence until China gives up its vast territorial and maritime 
claims. Neither will the United States happily support the ‘inclusion’ of Taiwan back 
into Beijing’s fold whilst China remains authoritarian.
On the other hand, despite widespread distrust of Beijing, the great strategic and 
diplomatic challenge for the United States and countries in the region, including 
Australia, arises from the fact that China is now viewed by the region (and by the 
United States) as a ‘legitimate’ rising state that is indispensable to the regional and 
global economy. Unlike the Soviet Union, or China under Mao Zedong, modern 
China is much more integrated into the existing regional and global economic system. 
This ensures that China is an essential regional and global economic player. In 2008, 
China was responsible for around one-quarter of global GDP growth, overtaking 
the United States as the most important economy in this regard. Chinese exports 
reached US$377 billion in 2008, and it is estimated that China holds more than 
US$1.3 trillion in USD denominated financial assets, including more than US$800 
billion in US Treasury bills.33 China has become the region’s primary export platform, 
importing more from the rest of Asia and exporting more to the rest of the world 
than any other Asian country.34 From US$100 billion in 2004, trade between China 
and ASEAN surpassed US$200 billion in 2008, and there is constant talk—although 
little progress—of a Free Trade Agreement between China and ASEAN by 2010.35 
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the rest of the world. Even though almost every country in the region sees the continued 
American presence as a welcome deterrent against a possibly disruptive China, it is 
unthinkable for American allies in Asia to pursue any explicit economic containment 
strategy or to diplomatically isolate Beijing in the absence of serious Chinese provocation. 
Doing so would jeopardise future prosperity in an area where economic regionalism is 
growing and also enrage a great power, hence bringing to a premature end the hope that 
an increasingly ‘socialised’ China could be peacefully integrated into the existing setup.
To give regional leaders less reason to publically express fears about China’s rise, 
Beijing has conducted a carefully crafted and well-executed diplomatic strategy designed 
to increase acceptance of China as a great power and appease fears that a rising China 
would be a threat to the existing order. For example, Beijing has deliberately highlighted 
‘consensus’ decision-making as the way forward and is emphasising primarily ‘win-win’ 
agreements with states in the region. Its engagement with ASEAN is relentless, having 
attended more than 40 major ASEAN meetings since 2000 compared to the Americans 
who have attended around 10. 
Moreover, Chinese attempts to build a case for its legitimacy in Asia, Europe and 
America have been helped by the fact that China’s return to greatness is a long-awaited 
development not only for China’s 1.3 billion people but also for the approximately 
40 million Chinese diaspora throughout these continents.
Beijing has even shown that it is capable of innovative regional leadership through 
the formation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) with China, Russia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan as full members. Four states, India, 
Iran, Mongolia and Pakistan, have observer status. Although arguably creating distrust 
in equal measure, China is also buying friends and influencing countries through 
‘no-strings attached’ aid policies in countries such as Cambodia, Myanmar and Sri Lanka. 
China has no interest in improved governance or better institutions in these recipient 
countries but expects and receives their support in the manner of client states. 
China’s economic integration and diplomatic successes presents a profound 
conundrum for the United States and its regional allies. Explicit attempts to ‘contain’ 
China and keep it isolated will create a resentful great power. Any regional government 
seen to be explicitly containing China will find an unsupportive domestic and regional 
audience. Even as suspicions of Beijing’s long-term intentions grow, few states in Asia 
are prepared to miss on the immediate benefits of economic cooperation with China, 
and are reluctant to explicitly alienate such an important rising power. 
The permanence of Sino-Indo tensions
The rise of China is frequently seen as an East and Southeast Asian strategic conundrum 
while India has long been viewed only as a South Asian power. Yet, in many respects, 
India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru shared Lord Curzon’s expansive view of 
the country’s strategic worth: India was ‘the pivot round which the defense problems 
of the Middle East, the Indian Ocean, and Southeast Asia revolve.’36 Likewise, Prime 
Minister Singh argued that India’s strategic footprint as a ‘super regional power covers 
the region bounded by the Horn of Africa, West Asia, Central Asia, Southeast Asia and 
beyond, to the reaches of the Indian Ocean.’37 A large country of such geo-strategic 
significance and ambition was always likely to experience tensions with Asia’s other great 
traditional power, China. As US-India policy expert Ashley Tellis argues, ‘China and 
India appeared destined for competition from the moment of their creation as modern 
states.’38 C. Raja Mohan makes a similar point:
I tell the Americans: You balanced China from 1949 to 1971, but then allied 
with Beijing from 1971 to 1989. India has been balancing China since the day 
the Chinese invaded Tibet in 1950. We have always balanced China—and that’s 
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Twentieth century history and the first decade of this century confirm this hypothesis. 
Even though Prime Minister Nehru initially held an optimistic view of India-China 
relations as the driving force behind a resurgent Asia, relations had soured by the late 
1950s with China accusing India of nursing ambitions for a ‘greater Indian empire.’40 
China’s invasion of Tibet in 1950 had previously erased the traditional buffer between 
China and British-ruled India. This was always a concern for Indian strategists even 
though Nehru initially turned a blind eye for the sake of harmonious China-India 
relations. The China-India war in 1962 led to a defeat for India and China seizing the 
Aksai Chin region, which linked Tibet and Xinjiang provinces.
China still claims some 90,000 square kilometres of Indian territory, including large 
parts of the eastern-most Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh (which has Myanmar to its 
east). To put this in geographical context, the disputed area is more than twice the size 
of Switzerland. Tensions remain real, illustrated by China recently blocking the Asian 
Development Bank’s US$2.9 billion loan destined for India because US$60 million of 
it was earmarked for a water program in Arunachal Pradesh.41 More recently, Beijing 
expressed ‘strong dissatisfaction’ over Prime Minister Singh’s visit to Arunachal Pradesh 
to help campaign in a local election. New Delhi responded by reaffirming that Arunachal 
Pradesh is ‘an integral and inalienable part of India.’42 The Indian military reported 
270 Chinese border incursions into Indian territories in 2008, double the figure from 
2007 and more than three times from 2006.43 As Newsweek reported, the Chinese 
state-run People’s Daily in an editorial in June 2009 criticised recent moves by India 
to strengthen its border defences and ominously declared that ‘China will not make 
any compromises in its border disputes with India.’ The editorial then asked whether 
New Delhi had ‘weighed the consequences of a potential conflict with China.’44
China and India are also constantly locked in a battle for influence in the buffer state 
of Nepal and the Bay of Bengal access state of Bangladesh. For example, China backs 
the Maoists in Nepal and sells arms to Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Nepal in an attempt 
to foment ‘contained instability’ and gradually dilute Indian influence in these states. 
Importantly, China offers just enough strategic and military (including nuclear weapons 
and ballistic missile45) assistance to Pakistan to keep India distracted in South Asia but 
not enough to become a focal point in the existing India-Pakistan problem. Finally, 
New Delhi is apprehensive about China’s militarisation, and in particular nuclearisation, 
of the Tibetan plateau. As an indication of very real tensions, China has not extended its 
‘no first use’ of nuclear weapons doctrine to include India.
The land disputes are not the only sources of tension. A key component of Beijing’s 
strategy was to help keep India preoccupied with its land-based neighbours, allowing 
Beijing a freer hand in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. But the dependence of 
both China and India on shipping commerce, especially energy imports (that pass through 
the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Aden, the Indian Ocean, and the Malacca Straits) will 
most likely make sea-based rather than land-based competition more important.
Even back in 1993, a former director of the General Logistics Department of the 
People’s Liberation Army, Zhao Nanqi, reversed long-standing policy by arguing that 
they could ‘no longer accept the Indian Ocean as an ocean only of the Indians.’46 
The Chinese Navy is now the second-largest navy in the world, with more than 250,000 
personnel and over 300 ships.47 It has been building three new submarines a year since 
1995 and now has around 85—the second largest such fleet in the world after the 
United States.48 It is building at least five ballistic missile submarines, each carrying 
12 intercontinental missiles and each missile having three nuclear warheads. To counter 
India’s natural advantage of access to the Indian Ocean (as well as American Fifth Fleet 
based in Bahrain), China has set up naval ports, listening stations, logistics facilities, and 
refueling depots in waters belonging to Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan49 in addition 
to one in Cambodia. This includes facilities in the Coco Islands, which lie only 18 km 
north of the Indian naval base in the Andaman Islands. China is constructing a waterway 
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in Myanmar.50 These are segments of what American and Indian analysts call China’s 
emerging ‘string of pearls’ strategy:51 efforts to increase access to ports and airfields, 
develop special diplomatic relationships, and modernise military forces that extend from 
the South China Sea through the Strait of Malacca, across the Indian Ocean, and on to 
the Arabian Gulf. Although there are still only very few actually discernable ‘pearls’ on 
the string, only Indian influence has prevented China from successfully signing on other 
‘string of pearls’ candidates such as Bangladesh, Maldives, Mauritius, and Seychelles.
There is strong evidence that competition between the two powers now involves 
both land and sea. For example, Indian strategist and former intelligence chief 
Vikram Sood believes that China’s strategy is all about keeping India bogged down by 
fomenting instability in its relations with Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Myanmar, 
whilst encircling India with its ‘string of pearls’ strategy—a move designed to ‘put 
India in pincers.’52 Beijing’s strategy was to confine India to being a South Asian power 
with only limited ambitions in the Indian Ocean, and prevent it from becoming an 
Asian or a global power. But the growing interests and ambitions of India means China 
will be disappointed in this regard. The reported February 2009 stand-off between 
Chinese destroyers and an Indian submarine in the Gulf of Aden—in international 
waters far away from Chinese and Indian territorial borders—is significant. 
As C. Raja Mohan notes, the fact that the stand-off took place in neutral territory 
suggests colliding interests that extend way beyond the territorial waters of either nation.53 
India is threatening to constrain Chinese influence in the South China Sea, and China 
is moving into India’s sphere of influence in the Indian Ocean. 
Although China’s yearning for a dominant role in a future post-America Asia leaves 
little room for Indian leadership, New Delhi sees itself as a major centre of power in 
Asia (and not just South Asia). It is significant that the most recent Indian naval strategy 
manual is titled Freedom to Use the Seas and speaks about India being ‘among the foremost 
centres of power—economic, technological, and cultural—in the coming decades.’ 
In New Delhi’s eyes, this calls for ‘a concomitant accretion of national power, of which 
the military power will be a critical dimension.’54 Although both countries are still 
primarily focused on domestic development and tensions can therefore be managed, 
there is little doubt that a rising India and China remain ‘strategic adversaries.’
Democratic India as a counter-balance against China
India’s commitment to democracy is sincere, having been long established and reaffirmed 
over decades. In a speech in 2005, Prime Minister Singh said that the ‘idea of India’ 
is the ‘idea of an inclusive, open, multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, multi-lingual society.’ 
Singh believes that this is ‘the dominant trend of political evolution of all societies in the 
21st century ... Liberal democracy is the natural order of political organisation in today’s 
world. All alternate systems [are an] aberration.’55
To be sure, democracy by itself has never been enough to overcome the different 
strategic cultures and diverging interests of India vis-à-vis America and its allies. There is 
no preordained harmony between the world’s most powerful democracy and the world’s 
largest democracy. For example, in examining the UN voting patterns of India compared 
to the United States in issues such as human rights, the Middle East, and arms control, 
the voting coincidence between the two powers varied from zero percent to 45% from 
1997–2003.56 But converging regional interests mean that democratic India becomes 
a strategic asset of huge significance. Indian and American leaders now refer to each 
other as ‘natural allies.’57 In particular, both sides believe that cooperation will eventually 
create a power balance in Asia that will help keep potential Chinese ambitions in check 
and constrain the ability of Beijing to challenge the existing liberal, open order in the 
future. 
As the paper pointed out earlier, India has traditionally been preoccupied with land-
based instability in its borders with Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar. But the great 
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power and interests grow, it is wisely focusing on its sea-based priorities and objectives, 
which will be more important in the future. This has opened up opportunities for the 
United States, its allies and partners, and India to reinforce and entrench their still 
fledging strategic partnership with extensive tactical cooperation at all levels.
India is adamant that it must remain the hegemon in the waters hugging its territorial 
borders. This is a concession the Americans and most of Asia are more than happy to 
make and will most likely offer India their blessing in this regard. In practical terms, 
India would seek an effective veto over actions of outside partners in these areas.
In the broader Indian Ocean (as well as the Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal), 
the US Pacific Command is eager to expand further naval cooperation with India in 
protecting the sea-lanes of the Indian Ocean. The United States and India will likely 
increase the scope and frequency of the already extensive naval and air force exercises 
and planning in these Indian Ocean sea lanes58 as well as deepen the broad-based 
dialogues and briefings with India. These briefings cover a wide range of matters relevant 
to South, Central and Southeast Asia, spanning Chinese military developments, policy 
in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, as well as US policy with rogue states such as Iran and 
North Korea. In terms of naval cooperation, Ashley Tellis suggests that ‘a cooperative 
division of labour with respect to ocean surveillance, search and rescue, anti-piracy 
operations, and humanitarian assistance would be a good place to start.’59 Indeed, this 
has occurred. India, with regional blessing, is becoming a hegemon in its own backyard 
and one of the great powers in Asia.
Built on the back of quiet and tireless diplomacy and thriving bilateral relationships, 
Indian naval cooperation with Southeast Asia is also impressive. According to Udai Bhanu 
Singh, Research Officer with the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), 
the conclusion of a bilateral defence cooperation agreement with Singapore in 2003 
opened the door for India to ramp up its security diplomacy in Southeast and East 
Asia.60 India has since signed defence cooperation agreements with Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Vietnam, and Cambodia. In fact, India-Indonesia naval cooperation goes back 14 years to 
the Ind-Indo Corpat arrangement, and New Delhi arranges more tactical naval exercises 
with Jakarta than any other country, including the United States. In 2005, the Indian 
aircraft carrier INS Viraat made inaugural visits to the ports of Singapore, Jakarta, and 
Klang in Malaysia. Already, India has naval bases in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands 
at the western mouth of the Malacca Strait, giving New Delhi a huge advantage over 
Beijing when it comes tactical positioning in this crucial shipping laneway.
Chinese attempts to extend its naval reach and power through relationships with 
states such as Pakistan, Myanmar and Sri Lanka directly work to dilute Indian naval 
influence in the south Arabian Sea, south Indian Ocean, and southern parts of Bay of 
Bengal. America is already explicitly committed to helping India become a world power, 
and more specifically, a world naval power. This is aligned with Indian intentions to 
become one of the great naval powers able to materially influence matters in the waters 
to its west, east and south.
Importantly, Southeast Asia feels remarkably unthreatened by the rise of the Indian 
Navy. As former Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew points out, Asia (with the 
exception of China) is not fundamentally concerned with India’s economic and military 
rise.61 In supporting an enhanced Indian naval presence in the Indian Ocean, it is 
unlikely that the Indian Navy would seek to overplay its role since it would not have the 
capability to demand a greater role in the Persian Gulf, Malacca Straits, or the South 
China Sea and impinge on America’s preferred areas of influence. In fact, it is likely 
that New Delhi will happily support continued American naval pre-eminence in these 
areas. The tactical confluence of interests means that Washington, New Delhi and South 
East Asian capitals consider each other’s naval presence—and the network of bilateral 
partnerships with New Delhi—as stabilising forces for the region. Offering India an 
enhanced role is already indicating to New Delhi that Washington and Asian allies and 
partners are prepared to welcome India as an emerging and trusted great power.
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The US-India partnership, as well as Indian engagement with East and Southeast 
Asia, is still in its early stages, but the foundations to build further are solid. If these 
relationships can continue to prosper from the bottom-up and if India’s strategic 
partnerships can be further integrated into the existing US-led order in Asia—for which 
the early indicators are promising—India’s future strategic, military and economic 
weight means that the twin prospects that China’s rise can be peacefully managed and 
the existing liberal order can survive rise dramatically. China is an ambitious and even 
revisionist power (when it comes to its land and maritime borders), but it remains a 
sensible rather than reckless one. This is why a continued American presence and the 
informal network of bilateral security relationships remain the single-most important 
factor in preserving the peace now and in the future. Placing structural constraints on 
Chinese actions as it rises will remain the primary and effective strategy in meeting the 
challenge of the Chinese conundrum. India is poised to add its formidable and growing 
weight in reinforcing this approach. 
That this can continue to occur depends on the successful coordination of many 
parts moving in sync. For example, India’s growing role as a strategic player depends 
on the continued success of its economic reform program and rapid development. 
The US-India relationship and Indian partnerships with other states depend on 
continued, tireless bottom-up functional cooperation, as well as top-down intent from 
all sides. There is still much work to do in order to build the region’s acceptance of any 
growing US-India partnership such that the partnership (as well as India’s other bilateral 
relationships) augments rather than competes with the existing US-led regional order 
as well as other regional institutions. For example, many Southeast Asian states will not 
easily accept agreements that are seen as competitive and dilute ASEAN’s relevance. 
A case in point is the 2007 Quadrilateral Initiative between the United States, India, 
Japan and Australia. The Initiative was viewed as an agreement that could reduce the 
relevance of ASEAN and of ASEAN-led forums such as the ARF. It was also seen as too 
explicitly an anti-Chinese containment agreement that might cause smaller states to 
‘choose’ between China and Initiative members.
Moreover, New Delhi needs to further enmesh itself in the manifold and sometimes 
tedious multilateral forums and processes that characterise diplomacy in Asia. 
Even though multilateral institutions such as ASEAN and the various ASEAN-led forums 
are weak in terms of compliance and enforcement procedures, they serve the purpose of 
reinforcing norms of counter-dominance and counter-interference in each other’s affairs. 
This is an important complement to the US-led ‘hub-and-spokes’ structure that has 
underpinned security and stability since World War II. China, for example, has learnt 
that it is much more effective to work with ASEAN to build influence and legitimacy 
than attempt to bully its way into ascendency.
Finally, the ‘strategic encirclement’ of China with India as one of the major centres of 
power needs to remain subtle and restrained. New Delhi must be allowed to continue to 
forge its own way and remain a ‘structural constraint’ on Chinese ambitions and actions, 
not an explicit one that is part of an anti-Chinese alliance. Importantly, China needs to 
remain confident that its interests and path towards continued prosperity lie in acceding 
to the existing US-led structure and competing within it rather than transforming or 
superseding it.
Conclusion: the importance of courting India
India is an Asian giant growing in confidence, ambition, power, wealth, and influence. 
Its diplomats are also increasingly active in the region. For example, India has announced 
plans to create 514 new positions in its Ministry of External Affairs over the next 
10 years.62 Importantly, its rise is not feared by other Asian states and its values and 
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Yet, current Australian government strategic thinking focuses excessively on 
East Asia and China in particular. For example, as Chris Rahman observed, the rise 
of India’s navy a decade ago even caught Canberra by surprise.63 Admittedly, defence 
cooperation with India has since deepened. For example, Canberra and New Delhi have 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Defence Cooperation in 2006 designed to 
deepen practical defence ties in maritime security and counter-terrorism. An Information 
Sharing Agreement was signed in 2007, which ‘will facilitate the sharing of classified 
information betw een the two countries’ defence organizations.’64 Most recently, Foreign 
Minister Stephen Smith visited New Delhi and formally requested that Australia be 
allowed to participate in the annual US-India Malabar exercises.65 These are positive 
developments.
However, the patient approach of quietly and steadily building meaningful bottom-
up military functional cooperation with the Indians in defence, as well as the need to 
conscientiously deepen the bilateral relationship, is at odds with Prime Minister Rudd’s 
attempts to hurriedly lead the construction of comprehensive, multilateral top-down 
security architecture for the whole region before Australia, the United States, or Asia is 
ready. Doing so prematurely will simply exacerbate the insecurity of Asian states vis-à-
vis a rising China since any such new structure would have to explicitly allow China an 
equal strategic status as a player in the region. Regional states will want this to occur only 
when they are sure that China is fully committed to the pre-existing rules and norms of 
behaviour in the region, which will be some time away. Meanwhile, America and Asian 
allies and partners much prefer to bulk up the informal network of security alliances and 
partners (including with India) to hedge and maximise leverage against a rising China 
before any serious discussion of new comprehensive and inclusive security architecture 
can take place. Far from the region entering into a dangerous period of ‘strategic 
drift’ as Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd contends,66 there is evidence that the 
United States, India, and key Asian partners are increasingly reading from the same 
strategic blueprint: A strong bilateral relationship with a rising India will be a critical 
factor in forging and strengthening the balance against a rising China in the future 
and in structurally constraining Beijing’s actions.67 A fully engaged India will improve 
the region’s leverage over a potentially disruptive China in the future. Subsequently, 
America and Asian states are busy doing the hard graft of building a lasting economic 
and strategic relationship with a rising India and bringing New Delhi into existing 
regional structures.
There is less evidence Canberra is reading from the same page. 
First, pushing for institutions that are all-inclusive and designed to discuss the full 
spectrum of security matters is certainly premature. Besides threatening to dilute the 
current strategy use to both assist with and manage China’s rise, it goes against regional 
diplomatic culture in discussing tensions in open forums involving third parties. 
The most constructive work is done behind doors without the pressure of a high-profile 
security forum. Besides, the great fear of smaller Asian states is to have to ‘choose’ between 
the United States and China. They have never had to do so explicitly because they do 
not take part in any substantive, high-level action-based security forums involving both 
China and the United States. A pan-Asian security forum might very well change that.
Second, and more related to the arguments in this paper, simply arguing that 
India be included in future security institutions is a token gesture that pays only lip-
service to India’s growing importance. That India is poorly appreciated by the Rudd 
government—despite the commonality in values and strategic interests as well as the 
enormous economic opportunities presented by India’s rise—is confirmed by the lack 
of energy and resources devoted to building the bilateral relationship with New Delhi. 
As C. Raja Mohan observes, the weakest link in strategic and diplomatic cooperation 
between India, the United States, and other Asian states is the weak relationship between 
New Delhi and Canberra.68 Discussions about what top-down, overarching security 
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first need to renew and reaffirm) are putting the strategic cart before the horse and are 
a mistake and distraction. Bear in mind that a poorly developed relationship between 
Canberra and New Delhi is not a regional deal-breaker when it comes to New Delhi’s 
growing strategic weight—India will simply become too big and important. But a poor 
or undeveloped relationship will do more future harm to Australia than it will to India. 
The India factor in Asia’s future will rise in importance despite our neglect, but it will 
reduce Australia’s future regional strategic relevance.
More generally, Canberra should reduce its focus on top-down architecture building 
for the moment and instead direct our limited resources and attention toward improving 
bilateral relationships, such as with Asia’s other giant—India. This also makes sense since 
Canberra’s influence will be enhanced in any future regional institution if Australia’s 
bilateral relationship with key players such as India is first strengthened.
The paper is not denying that some efforts have been made. The annual talks 
between the Australian Chief of Defence and Indian counterparts is a good initiative, 
but Australia’s poor overall diplomatic engagement with and strategic appreciation of 
India is nevertheless worrying. For example, while Australia holds an annual Defence 
Strategic Dialogue with China involving the Secretary of Defence in addition to the 
Chief of Defence Force, there is no equivalent annual Secretary-level bi-lateral dialogue 
with India.69 Even though the Rudd government in 2008 pulled out of the ‘Strategic 
Dialogue plus India’ involving the ill-fated Quadrilateral Initiative partners, there is 
no reason why Canberra should not work towards instituting an annual Secretary-
level bi-lateral security dialogue with New Delhi to discuss bottom-up cooperation, 
but prudently leaving aside top-down strategic matters until New Delhi is ready.
Meanwhile, Australia has its own nuclear-related stumbling block with India that 
is holding back the prospect of better relations. It is time to revisit the arguments for 
and against selling uranium to India—a non-signatory to the Non Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT)—that are becoming less relevant. The Rudd government’s refusal to honour 
the previous Howard government’s deal to sell uranium to India—despite Rudd 
subsequently supporting the 2008 ‘India waiver’ as a member of the 45-nation Nuclear 
Suppliers Group (NSG) which allowed the sale of uranium to India in 200870—remains 
an inconsistent, anachronistic and dogmatic stance, and an unnecessary slight against 
India.71 Despite the Rudd government’s continual reassurance that Australia’s refusal 
to sell uranium to non-signatories of the NPT is not aimed at India,72 the fact remains 
that the only other nuclear powers that are non-signatories to the NPT are North Korea 
and Pakistan.73 New Delhi therefore sees Canberra’s position as tantamount to treating 
‘responsible India’ as an ‘irresponsible rogue state’ or as a ‘nuclear proliferator,’ although 
India (unlike Pakistan) has never been one. This stumbling block in our relations with 
New Delhi should be removed.
Furthermore, the ‘Asia-Pacific’ has always been understood as a strategic rather 
than geographical construction. Given its growing economic interests as a result of 
the Look East policy, Canberra should devote proper resources to seriously push the 
argument that India be incorporated and encouraged to play an active role into the full 
array of existing regional institutions, especially a reorganised Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) organisation. Indeed, even though bilateral relationships remain 
the main game, China is cleverly using existing institutions to extend its influence.74 
Given India’s rising role as a ‘structural constraint’ and counter against Chinese power 
and influence, Canberra should relentlessly seek to push for New Delhi’s inclusion in as 
many existing regional multilateral forums as possible.
The enormous importance of India should no longer be our strategic blind spot. 
If Australia and the Rudd government can help smooth the path of a rising India into 
Asia, then we will undoubtedly enhance our future relevance and play our part in 
reinforcing existing foundations for a stable peace and prosperity in the region that may 
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